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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Cody Sellers appeals from his judgment of conviction for five counts of
injury to a child.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Sellers with five counts of injury to a child with a great
bodily injury enhancement.

(R., vol. I, pp. 106-10.)

The gravamen of the

offenses were that on four different days Sellers “inflict[ed] unjustifiable physical
pain or mental suffering by an act or acts of physical force” which caused the
two-year-old victim to “sustain an abusive head injury” (Counts I-III, V) and on the
fourth day also did “willfully cause or permit the child to be placed in a situation
endangering her health or person, by failing to obtain medical attention” (Count
IV). (R., vol. I, pp. 108-09.)
Prior to trial the district court proffered jury instructions and heard
objections. (Tr., vol. I, p. 108, L. 10 – p. 112, L. 12.) Prior to trial there was no
objection to the court’s proposed elements instructions.

(Id.)

After the jury

returned a verdict of guilty on all five counts the district court submitted the great
bodily injury enhancement to the jury. (Tr., vol. III, p. 1649, L. 10 – p. 1652, L.
17; R., vol. II, pp. 340-41, 352.) Immediately after the jury retired to consider the
enhancement, Sellers’ trial counsel moved to have his client acquitted of the
felonies and deemed convicted of five misdemeanors because the instructions
omitted the element differentiating misdemeanor and felony injury to a child. (Tr.,
vol. III, p. 1653, L. 6 – p. 1655, L. 9.) After hearing arguments from both sides,
1

the district court denied the request for acquittal and instead brought the jury
back into court, instructed them on the missing element, and had them find
Sellers guilty or not guilty of that element. (Tr., vol. III, p. 1656, L. 3 – p. 1673, L.
12; R., vol. II, pp. 327, 342-43.) The jury found Sellers guilty of that element on
four of the five charges (finding him not guilty of the element on Count III). (R.,
vol. II, pp. 342-43.) The jury ultimately found Sellers guilty of the great bodily
injury enhancement as well. (R., vol. II, p. 344.)
After trial, Sellers filed a motion for a new trial. (R., vol. II, pp. 359-63.)
The district court denied the motion because it failed to raise any issue allowed
by the statute governing new trials. (R., vol. III, pp. 434-54.)
At sentencing, the district court imposed concurrent sentences of one year
for the misdemeanor (Count III), 10 years with five years fixed on the nonenhanced felonies (Counts I, II and IV), and 25 years with 10 years determinate
on the enhanced felony (Count V). (R., vol. III, pp. 429-33.) Sellers filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R., vol. III, pp. 455-58.)

2

ISSUES
Sellers states the issues on appeal as:
1.

“[T]he trial court incorrectly instructed the jury as to the elements of the
charged offenses and exacerbated the issue in attempting to correct the
instructions.”

2.

“Sellers argues that the misdemeanor conviction entered by the trial on
Count III was not appropriately before the jury, nor were all the elements
in Idaho Code § 18-1501(2) proven beyond a reasonable doubt as
required by Idaho law.”

3.

“Sellers argues that the trial court erred in allowing Counts IV and V to be
tried separately [sic—the counts were tried in the same trial] as they were
part of a single criminal episode, thus violating constitutional double
jeopardy protections.”

4.

“Sellers argues that the trial court improperly denied motions for cause to
remove biased jurors.”

5.

“Sellers asks the Court to correct the illegal sentencing issues raised as to
Counts III, IV, and V.”

6.

“Sellers also argues that the sentence for the convictions were unduly
harsh given the circumstances.”

7.

“Sellers argues that even if not all of the above errors were prejudicial,
combined, the errors denied Sellers due process ….”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 1 (issues extracted from longer statements).)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Sellers failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
submitted an element originally omitted from the jury instruction for
deliberations instead of declaring a mistrial?

2.

Has Sellers waived his claim that it was error to enter a judgment on his
misdemeanor conviction because it is not supported with cogent argument
or applicable legal authority?

3.

Has Sellers failed to show the district court erred by concluding that Count
IV (charging neglect for failing to obtain medical help for the victim) and
Count V (for physically abusing the victim and inflicting a head injury) were
not the “same offense” for purposes of double jeopardy?
3

4.

Has Sellers failed to show he was tried by a biased jury?

5.

Has Sellers failed to show an abuse of sentencing discretion?

6.

Has Sellers failed to show cumulative error because he has failed to show
errors to cumulate?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Sellers Has Failed To Show That Bifurcation Of Jury Deliberations On The
Elements Of The Charges Violated Any Right
A.

Introduction
After realizing that the elements instructions submitted to the jury did not

include an element of the crime, and rejecting Sellers’ contention that he was
entitled to acquittals on the felonies and entry of judgment on misdemeanors, the
judge submitted additional instructions and a verdict form for the jury to
deliberate and address the missing element. (Tr., vol. III, p. 1653, L. 6 – p. 1673,
L. 12; R., vol. II, pp. 327, 342-43.) The jury found Sellers guilty on that element
in four of the five counts. (R., vol. II, pp. 342-43.)
On appeal, Sellers has abandoned the claim that the error in omitting an
element of the crime from the instructions entitled him to an acquittal, and instead
argues that the district court erred by not declaring a mistrial or otherwise
granting a new trial after the error in the elements instructions was called to its
attention. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 2-13.) Thus, the parties agree that the elements
instructions initially erroneously omitted a necessary element, but dispute only
the adequacy and appropriateness of the remedy granted. Because Sellers did
not request a mistrial below, he must show that failing to grant him one sua
sponte was fundamental error.

Application of the relevant law to the record

shows that the district court did not abuse its discretion by correcting the error by
instructing the jury to deliberate on and decide the omitted element, rather than
grant a mistrial or a new trial.

5

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to declare a mistrial is within the discretion of the district

court, and such a determination will only be reversed when that discretion has
been abused. State v. Talmage, 104 Idaho 249, 254, 658 P.2d 920, 925 (1983).
C.

Sellers Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error For Not Declaring A
Mistrial
At trial, Sellers did not request a mistrial, but rather requested a

termination of the trial with entry of convictions for misdemeanors. (Tr., vol. III, p.
1653, L. 6 – p. 1655, L. 9.) His argument on appeal that he should have been
granted a mistrial or a new trial was not preserved by a timely objection.1
Claims of error not preserved by timely objection are reviewed using a
three-part test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.

Sellers later moved for a new trial claiming it was error for the court to submit
the omitted element to the jury after it had returned its first verdict. (R., vol. II, pp.
362-63.) The district court denied the motion, reaching the merits. (R., vol. III,
pp. 447-53.) The state submits that because Sellers did not request a mistrial,
and requested the remedy of a second trial only after the first trial was completed
in a manner unsatisfactory to him, he failed to assert a timely objection and
therefore must show fundamental error. It is the state’s position that he has
failed to show error under any standard, fundamental or otherwise.
1
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State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). Application of this
test shows no fundamental error.
First, Sellers has not provided any authority that there is a constitutionally
required remedy for the omission of an element in jury instructions. He has thus
failed to show clear constitutional error in the remedy of having the undischarged
trial jury deliberate the omitted element. Second, it is quite clear from the record
that Sellers’ trial counsel tactically timed his objection and requested remedy of a
conviction on misdemeanors.

Thus, not moving for a mistrial was a tactical

decision. Finally, Sellers has failed to show that not simultaneously considering
all the elements changed the outcome of the jury’s decisions. Sellers’ argument
that the jury entered into consideration of that last element having already
concluded the other elements had been proven is not legitimate because the
conclusion that the other elements had been proven was based on the evidence
provided at trial. There is no plausible theory that the order in which the jury
considered the elements changed the jury’s weighing of the evidence. Sellers’
has therefore failed to show prejudice on the record.2

Sellers’ claim also fails if the claim was preserved. He has simply failed to show
that bifurcating consideration of the elements violated due process or was
otherwise error. Even if it was error, the error was necessarily harmless because
the Court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the bifurcation of
deliberations did not change the jury’s view of what the evidence proved. I.C.R.
52 (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded.”); State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 140, 334 P.3d 806,
814 (2014) (“To establish harmless error, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.”).
2
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Sellers did not by timely objection preserve the claim that the proper
remedy for omission of an element of the crime was to declare a mistrial or
otherwise grant a new trial, and that the remedy provided—submitting the
omitted element to the jury for consideration—was error.

He thus has the

appellate burden of showing fundamental error on the face of the record. On
appeal he has failed to show any element of the fundamental error test.
Therefore, he has failed to show reversible error.
II.
Sellers Has Waived His Claim That It Was Error To Enter A Judgment On His
Misdemeanor Conviction Because It Is Not Supported With Cogent Argument Or
Applicable Legal Authority
The jury convicted Sellers on Count III of the elements constituting
misdemeanor injury to a child, but acquitted him of the element that would have
made the crime a felony. (R., vol. II, pp. 340, 342.) The district court thereafter
entered judgment on Count III as a misdemeanor. (R., vol. III, p. 430.) On
appeal Sellers argues that entering judgment on misdemeanor injury to a child
after the jury found him guilty of the elements of misdemeanor injury to a child
was fundamental error. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-15.) It is well settled, however,
that the appellate courts of Idaho “will not consider an issue which is not
supported by cogent argument and authority.” In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 109,
320 P.3d 1262, 1268 (2014) (internal quotations omitted).

Because Sellers’

argument is unsupported by cogent argument or relevant authority, it is not
properly before this Court for consideration on appeal.
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III.
The Act Of Injuring The Victim And The Omission Of Securing Medical Care For
The Victim Are Not The “Same Offense” For Purposes Of Double Jeopardy
A.

Introduction
Count V of the information charged Sellers with inflicting “physical pain or

mental suffering by an act or acts of physical force” causing “an abusive head
injury.” (R., vol. I, p. 109.) Count IV charged Sellers with causing or permitting
the child to be in a situation endangering her health or person “by failing to obtain
health care.” (Id.) Prior to trial, Sellers moved to dismiss either Count IV or
Count V because infliction of injuries and then failing to get medical help for
those injuries “appear to be part of a singular [sic] episode or continuing event.”
(R., vol. I, pp. 128-33.) The district court denied the motion. (R., vol. I, pp. 17780.)
On appeal Sellers argues the district court erred because the two offenses
arose out of the “same criminal episode.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-22.)

Application of the law to the record in this case shows no error.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional

protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review.
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000).
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C.

Sellers Has Failed To Show Legislative Intent That He Be Punished Only
Once For Both Injuring A Child And Then Neglecting That Child
The United States Constitution prevents more than one jeopardy “for the

same offense.”

U.S. Const., amend. V.

The main protection of the Double

Jeopardy Clause is “to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards
of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.” Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (internal quotations omitted).

It also,

however, “protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
“With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the
Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from
prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.”

Missouri v.

Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 365 (1983). See also Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376,
381 (1989) (“in the multiple punishments context” the interest protected by the
Double Jeopardy Clause is “limited to ensuring that the total punishment did not
exceed that authorized by the legislature”) (internal quotations omitted)).

To

determine legislative intent:
“The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to
be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one,
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not.”
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 337 (1981) (quoting Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
Counts IV and V did not charge the “same offense” or create a risk of
punishment beyond that authorized by the legislature. First, they did not charge
10

the “same act or transaction.” Count IV charged neglect for failing to obtain
needed medical care.

Count V charged abuse for inflicting a head injury.

Because the two counts charge entirely different acts (or, more accurately,
charge an act constituting abuse and a different omission constituting neglect)
they are not the same or included offenses. Because the underlying act and
omission are not the same “act or transaction,” there is no plausible ground for
concluding they are the “same offense” and that the legislature intended only one
punishment for a defendant who commits an act of abuse on a child, causing an
injury, and then neglects a child by not getting necessary medical care.
Second, even if both counts had arisen from the “same act or transaction,”
each requires proof of a fact the other does not and is therefore not the “same
offense” for purposes of double jeopardy. To prove Count V the state had to
prove that Sellers “inflict[ed] … unjustifiable pain or mental suffering.” I.C. § 181501(1).

To prove Count IV the state had to prove Sellers, having care or

custody of the child, “caus[ed] or permit[ted] [the] child to be placed in such
situation that its person or health is endangered.” I.C. § 18-1501(1). To prove
the former did not require proof of the latter, and vice-versa. If these crimes had
been committed by different people instead of the same person, there is no doubt
that proof of one’s guilt would not establish the other’s guilt as well. This is so
because each requires proof of a fact not required to prove the other. Because
the legislature has required proof of different facts for abuse and neglect,
application of the Blockburger test requires the conclusion that abuse and
neglect are not the “same offense” for purposes of double jeopardy.
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Application of the relevant legal standards shows that punishing Sellers for
injuring the victim and also punishing him for neglecting the victim by failing to
obtain medical care for her injuries did not impose greater punishment than the
legislature intended. The district court correctly concluded that mere temporal
proximity did not render the charged crimes, one addressing an affirmative act
and the other a criminal failure to act, the “same crime” for double punishment
purposes.
Sellers argues that Count IV and Count V charged the “same offense”
because they both arose out of the “same criminal episode.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 17-19.) For this proposition he relies on State v. Moffat, 154 Idaho 529, 300
P.3d 61 (Ct. App. 2013). (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-19.) Review of that opinion
refutes Sellers’ argument.
During a dispute with his girlfriend, Moffat “grabbed her by the hair,
grabbed her around the throat, threw her around the room, pushed her into
objects, and pushed her to the ground.” Moffat, 154 Idaho at 530, 300 P.3d at
62. The state charged Moffat with misdemeanor domestic battery by citation,
and later charged him with felony attempted strangulation. Id. He pled guilty to
the misdemeanor and moved to dismiss the felony. Id.
In deciding whether double jeopardy barred the second prosecution the
Court of Appeals applied a two-step analysis. First, it reviewed whether both
crimes contained an element not found in the other, determined that
strangulation was a form of battery, and concluded that although the
strangulation charge contained an element not found in the battery charge, the

12

battery charge contained no additional element not found in the strangulation
charge. Id. at 530-32, 300 P.3d at 62-64. Thus, review of the elements showed
domestic battery was a lesser included offense of attempted strangulation. Id.
Second, it made “the factual inquiry of whether Moffat’s crimes were part of one
continuing event or transaction,” ultimately concluding they were. Id. at 532-33,
300 P.3d at 64-65. Because the domestic battery, for which Moffat had already
suffered jeopardy, was both legally and factually a lesser included offense of the
charged attempted strangulation, Moffat could not be put at a second jeopardy
on the attempted strangulation charge. Id.3
As set forth above, applying this two-part test shows no double jeopardy
violation. Because Count IV contains a neglect element not found in Count V,
and Count V contains an abuse element not found in Count IV, these charges
pass the elements test and are thus proper subjects of double punishment even
if they arose out of the same act or transaction. Moreover, as stated above, they
also pass the “continuing event or transaction” test because the medical neglect

The state submits that if Moffat had involved a single jeopardy instead of
successive jeopardy, and thus limited the issue to only whether multiple
convictions allowed greater punishment than the legislature intended, the
outcome of that case would have been different. Specifically, if in a single
charging document the state had charged three counts of domestic battery—one
for pulling hair, another count for pushing her into objects, and a third for pushing
her to the floor—and a fourth count charging attempted strangulation for the
strangulation, such would not have run afoul of legislative intent on punishment.
See, e.g., State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 33 P.3d 218 (Ct. App. 2001) (evidence
of other acts of violence against the victim during single attack not included
offenses of charged offenses). Because the issue in this case is not a second
jeopardy but only double punishment—and therefore limited to determining what
punishments the legislature intended—the proper analysis is even more limited
than that used in Moffat.
3
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was not merely a continuation of the physical abuse. See, e.g., State v. Moad,
156 Idaho 654, 330 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2014) (although battery with intent to
commit rape normally merges into completed rape conviction, battery with intent
to commit rape committed after successful rape is a new offense). The analysis
of Moffat does not assist Sellers because it does not show that punishing Sellers
for both abusing and then neglecting the child exceeded the punishment
authorized by the legislature.
Sellers proposes reading Moffat so broadly as to incorporate two
repudiated double jeopardy legal standards for a “single criminal episode” test.
First, the legal standard proposed by Sellers is indistinguishable from the “one
criminal episode” test proposed by Justice Brennan, but which never garnered
support of more than three justices. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169
(1977) (concurring opinion espousing test requiring state to “join at one trial all
the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act,
occurrence, episode, or transaction”); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 454
(1970) (same); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 395-96 (1970). The Supreme
Court of the United States has consistently refused to adopt a “single criminal
episode” test: “We have steadfastly refused to adopt the ‘single transaction’ view
of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 790
(1985) (rejecting an argument for Justice Brennan’s test).
The importance of the rejection of this standard is demonstrated by Morris
v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237 (1986). Mathews was involved in a robbery where his
partner was shot to death while the two men tried to avoid capture. Id. at 238-39.
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Because the coroner initially ruled the death a suicide, the state charged
Mathews with aggravated robbery but not murder, and he pled guilty. Id. at 23940.

When additional evidence showing that the partner had been murdered

came to light, the state charged Mathews with aggravated murder, and Mathews
was convicted after a trial. Id. at 240-42. The Ohio appellate court concluded
(on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States) that because the
robbery was an element of the aggravated murder, double jeopardy prohibited
the state from subjecting Mathews to a second jeopardy for aggravated murder.
The court reduced the conviction from aggravated murder to murder, because
the latter charge did not include participation in the robbery as an element. Id. at
242-43.
The only issue addressed by the Supreme Court was “whether reducing
respondent's conviction for aggravated murder to a conviction for murder is an
adequate remedy for the double jeopardy violation.” Id. at 245. The Court held
that “when a jeopardy-barred conviction is reduced to a conviction for a lesser
included offense which is not jeopardy barred, the burden shifts to the defendant
to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted
of the nonjeopardy-barred offense absent the presence of the jeopardy-barred
offense.” Id. at 246-47.
The significance of this is that Justice Brennan dissented, stating he
“adhere[d] to [his] view that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires that except in
extremely limited circumstances not present here, all the charges against a
defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or
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transaction be prosecuted in one proceeding” and barred any further legal
proceedings arising out of the criminal episode.

Id. at 257 (Brennan, J.

dissenting) (internal quotes omitted). The rejection of Justice Brennan’s same
episode or transaction test meant that, although double jeopardy barred a
second jeopardy for the robbery, it did not bar jeopardy for the murder, even
though both crimes arose from the same criminal episode. Sellers’ advocacy for
a “single criminal episode” test should be rejected as incompatible with Supreme
Court precedent.
The second rejected legal standard Sellers seeks to resurrect is the
repealed Idaho statutory double jeopardy standard.

Idaho Code § 18-301,

repealed in 1995, provided:
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by
different provisions of this code may be punished under either of
such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than
one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars
a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.
This provision “constrain[ed] punishment or prosecution for different crimes
based on the same conduct.” State v. Lynch, 126 Idaho 388, 390, 883 P.2d
1080, 1082 (1994) (holding that I.C. § 18-301 prohibited prosecution for both
failure to maintain lane and DUI).
The protection afforded by this statute is broader than that created
by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. The Fifth Amendment prohibits double jeopardy for
the “same offense,” while Section 18–301 proscribes double
punishment or prosecution for the same “act or omission.” Thus, in
the constitutional arena the inquiry is whether the charged crimes
involve separate elements, whereas our inquiry under I.C. § 18–
301 is whether the charged crimes are based upon separate acts.
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State v. Castaneda, 125 Idaho 234, 235, 869 P.2d 234, 235 (Ct. App. 1994).
See also Lynch, 126 Idaho at 390, 883 P.2d at 1082. The standard required by
this repealed statute, which exceeded the scope of constitutional protections, is
indistinguishable from the “single criminal episode” test proposed by Sellers:
The applicability of section 301 depends upon whether a separate
and distinct act can be established as the basis for each
prosecution, regardless of whether the offenses require proof of
differing elements. The term “act,” as defined by the statute, refers
to that term in its ordinary sense, but also includes a course of
conduct of such a nature as to amount to a single act, that is, a
course of conduct which does not consist of divisible transactions.
Compare Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407,
85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985) (rejecting a single-transaction test for
purposes of applying former jeopardy protection contained in the
fifth amendment).
In determining whether a defendant's conduct is divisible into
separate, distinct events, we employ a “temporal test”-a test of
time. Under this test, if one of the offenses was completed prior to
the commission of the second crime, then the two cannot be said to
arise from the “same act,” and the provisions of section 18-301 do
not apply.
State v. Smith, 121 Idaho 20, 23-24, 822 P.2d 539, 542-43 (Ct. App. 1991)
(footnotes and citations, with one exception, omitted, emphasis original). Sellers’
attempt to resurrect the repealed extra-constitutional standard in I.C. § 18-301
should be rejected.
Sellers next argues that the Idaho Constitution (unlike the Constitution of
the United States) employs a “pleading theory” that he asserts should result in a
finding of a double jeopardy violation because the abuse resulting in a head
injury “was the means” by which the neglect for failing to obtain medical care was
accomplished.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-20.)
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This standard, however, is

completely incompatible with established double jeopardy law regarding multiple
punishment.
The standard applicable to multiple punishment claims under the federal
constitution is clear: “With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single
trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing
court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.” Hunter,
459 U.S. at 365. It is impossible to reconcile this standard with the “pleading
theory.” Clearly the prosecutor may not alter legislative intent by how he or she
pleads a case. The state submits that the “pleading theory” is inapposite to the
relevant inquiry.
If the Court applies the “pleading theory” it is clear the abuse was not the
“means” by which Sellers accomplished the neglect, nor vice-versa. See State v.
Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 529, 261 P.3d 519, 523 (2011) (crime may be lesser
included offense if it was the means by which the other crime was committed).
Indeed, if one person committed the abuse of the victim and inflicted the head
injury and another person with care or custody of the child neglected the victim
and refused to get medical assistance, each would be independently guilty of
separate and different crimes. Neither crime was the “means” by which the other
crime was committed.
The crime of abusing the child and injuring her and the crime of neglecting
her by failing to obtain needed medical care are separate crimes under any and
all double jeopardy theories. Sellers has therefore failed to show error in the
denial of his motion to dismiss either Count IV or Count V.
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IV.
Sellers Has Failed To Show He Was Tried By A Biased Jury
A.

Introduction
During voir dire, one of the questions asked by the district court was

whether any of the prospective jurors or their close family members had been a
victim of child abuse. (Tr., vol. I, p. 167, Ls. 19-22.) Prospective juror number 10
informed the court that her daughter had been physically abused by a babysitter
36 years ago, and that her step-grandson had been physically abused by a
stepfather. (Tr., vol. I, p. 175, L. 17 – p. 176, L. 24; p. 178, Ls. 19-25.) She
stated that she would decide the case on the evidence and find the defendant not
guilty if that was what the evidence indicated. (Tr., vol. I, p. 177, Ls. 4-12, 2225.) During the parties’ voir dire she acknowledged that child abuse was an “iffy
subject” for her and the defense probably would not want her as a juror because
of her experience, but reaffirmed that she would make any ultimate decision of
guilt based on the evidence. (Tr., vol. I, p. 179, L. 8 – p. 180, L. 25.) Sellers
challenged this juror for cause, but the district court accepted her statement that
she would decide the case based on the evidence and rejected the challenge.
(Tr., vol. I, p. 208, L. 14 – p. 210, L. 12.)
The district court also asked whether the prospective jurors knew the
prosecutor. (Tr., vol. I, p. 153, L. 25 – p. 154, L. 8.) Prospective juror number 20
indicated in the positive and stated he trusted the prosecutor’s judgments, but
also stated that he could decide the case based only on the evidence. (Tr., vol. I,
p. 154, L. 11 – p. 155, L. 1.) Sellers also challenged this potential juror for cause,
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but the district court denied the challenge. (Tr., vol. I, p. 251, L. 17 – p. 253, L.
10; p. 345, L. 7 – p. 346, L. 11.)
The parties excused 16 potential jurors using peremptory challenges,
including potential juror 20 but not potential juror 10, who sat on the jury. (Tr.,
vol. I, p. 346, L. 19 – p. 348, L. 4; R., vol. II, pp. 349-50.)
On appeal Sellers claims error in the district court’s denial of his for-cause
challenges to potential jurors 10 and 20. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-31.) He has
failed to show error because the district court was within its discretion to accept
the potential jurors’ representations that they would decide the case based on the
evidence. Moreover, he has failed to show error in relation to potential juror 20
because he did not sit as a juror and therefore could not have caused the jury to
be biased.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The determination whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict

is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed
absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 609,
150 P.3d 296, 302 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted).
C.

Sellers Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
Because The Potential Jurors Both Stated They Could Decide The Case
Based On The Evidence
“A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury.”

State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011) (citing U.S. Const.,
amends. V, VI, XIV; Idaho Const. art. 1, §§ 7, 13). Unless a prospective juror
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indicates an inability to “lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court,” it is presumed the prospective juror is
impartial. Id. (quoting State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 506, 988 P.2d 1170,
1180 (1999)). As explained by the United States Supreme Court:
[T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross
section of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of
individual viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as
the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn
duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case.
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 184 (1986)). Consistent with these principles, “a trial court does not
abuse its discretion by refusing to excuse for cause jurors whose answers during
voir dire initially give rise to challenges for cause but who later assure the court
that they will be able to remain fair and impartial.” Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho
138, 141, 937 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1997), quoted in Nightengale v. Timmel, 151
Idaho 347, 353, 256 P.3d 755, 761 (2011); see also Ellington, 151 Idaho at 70,
253 P.3d at 744 (citation omitted) (“Although not always dispositive, the trial
judge is entitled to rely on assurances from venire persons concerning partiality
or bias.”). In addition, where “a party uses one of its peremptory challenges to
remove a juror it argues should have been removed for cause, the party must
show on appeal that ‘he was prejudiced by being required to use a peremptory
challenge to remove the juror.’” Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 354, 256 P.3d at 762
(quoting State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 570, 808 P.2d 1313, 1315 (1991))
(brackets omitted).
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The record in this case shows that both challenged jurors represented to
the district court that they could decide the case based on the evidence. (Tr., vol.
I, p. 154, L. 17 – p. 155, L. 1; p. 177, Ls. 4-12, 22-25; p. 180, Ls. 10-25; p. 345, L.
19 – p. 346, L. 9.)

In both instances the district court accepted those

representations. (Tr., vol. I, p. 210, Ls. 6-12; p. 253, Ls. 4-10; p. 345, L. 19 – p.
346, L. 11.) Moreover, potential juror 20 did not sit on the jury. (Tr., vol. I, p.
346, L. 19 – p. 348, L. 4; R., vol. II, pp. 349-50.) The record does not support an
abuse of discretion by the district court under the applicable law.
Relying on State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 348 P.3d 1 (2015), Sellers
claims that, after “admit[ting] bias” potential juror 10 gave “no unequivocal
assurance of the ability to be impartial despite several efforts by the court or
counsel to elicit such assurance.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 27-28.) This argument
is unsupported in the record.
First, the juror did not admit bias. She conveyed that two of her family
members had been physically abused as children. At no time did she state that
her experience would cause her to be biased against the defendant. Moreover,
every time she was asked whether she could decide the case based on the
evidence, including acquitting the defendant if the evidence did not prove his
guilt, she stated she could. (Tr., vol. I, p. 177, Ls. 9-25; p. 180, Ls. 10-25.) Even
Sellers’ trial counsel found eight potential jurors he wanted on the jury less than
juror 10 and excused them with peremptory challenges. This strongly indicates
that Sellers’ trial counsel had confidence in potential juror 10’s representation she
would render a verdict based on the evidence.

22

Actual bias is “‘the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in
reference to the case, or to either of the parties, which, in the exercise of a sound
discretion on the part of the trier, leads to the inference that he will not act with
entire impartiality.’” Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 421-22, 348 P.3d at 36-37 (quoting
I.C. § 19-2019(2)). The mere fact the juror had a child and grandchild who were
physically abused did not alone show actual bias. Moreover, even a potential
juror who has expressed bias need not be excused “if the juror can lay aside his
impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in
court.” Id. at 422, 348 P.3d at 37 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Here the juror repeatedly stated she could render a verdict on the evidence
presented in court. Thus, Sellers has failed to show any abuse of discretion.
Sellers next argues that failing to excuse potential juror 20 for cause made
his jury unfair because potential juror 10 was on it. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 28-30.)
This argument is meritless. Sellers has failed to show that having potential juror
10 sit on the case rendered his jury biased. If he had shown that having potential
juror 10 on the jury rendered it biased he is entitled to a new trial. In neither case
would the ruling on the motion to excuse juror 20 for cause be relevant.
The district court rejected the motion to excuse for cause prospective juror
10 after she repeatedly stated she could lay aside her impression or opinion and
render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. The record shows no
abuse of discretion.
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V.
Sellers Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion
For the conviction on Count V, injury to a child enhanced by the great
bodily harm enhancement, the district court imposed a sentence of 25 years with
10 years determinate. (R., vol. III, p. 432.) For the other convictions the district
court imposed shorter, concurrent sentences.

(R., vol. III, pp. 430-32.)

In

imposing these sentences the district court considered the jury’s finding of guilt,
mitigating factors such as lack of any criminal history and support of family and
friends, applied the relevant legal standards, and concluded that the seriousness
of the crime required the substantial sentence it was imposing. (Tr., vol. III, p.
1845, L. 11 – p. 1860, L. 19.)
“Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v.
Anderson, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v.
Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)). Where a sentence is within
statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish that the sentence is a clear
abuse of discretion.

State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615

(2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry
this burden, the appellant must show that his sentence is excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts.

Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.

A

sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary objective of
protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728,
730 (1978). The Court reviews the whole sentence on appeal and presumes that
the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of
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confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In
deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable
sentence where reasonable minds might differ. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,
568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
Sellers contends the district court abused its discretion citing the same
considerations specifically articulated and addressed by the district court at
sentencing, such as the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, his lack of history,
and family support. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-23.) Because the district court
specifically considered all such factors Sellers’ argument fails.

Sellers also

argues that his sentence should be based on the median sentence for all injury to
child cases. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 23.) This argument fails as a matter of law,
because comparative sentencing is not an appropriate standard. See State v.
Pederson, 124 Idaho 179, 183, 857 P.2d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 1993) (“It is well
settled that not every offense in like category calls for identical punishment; there
may properly be a variation in sentences between different offenders, depending
on the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant in his or
her individual case.” (Citations omitted.)). It also fails factually because Sellers
ignores the enhancement he was convicted of and has not shown that half of the
defendants convicted of injury to a child deserved a sentence longer than his.
The sentences imposed by the district court are appropriate considering
the facts of the crime and the character of the offender. Sellers has failed to
show any abuse of sentencing discretion.
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VI.
Sellers Failed To Show Cumulative Error
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.

State v.

Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). In addition,
cumulative error analysis does not include errors not objected to unless those
errors are found to be fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982.
As set forth above, Sellers has failed to show any error or fundamental error.
There are, therefore, no errors to cumulate.
Moreover, Sellers has failed to present a viable theory of cumulative error.
One of the errors he claims is a double jeopardy violation for double punishment.
If Sellers were correct, and Count IV was a lesser included offense of Count V, it
was not error to try both the lesser and the greater included offenses in the same
trial. His remedy would not be a new trial, but instead a merger of the two
convictions and sentences. Even if Sellers were correct on his claim that Count
IV and V were the same offense (which he is not) such could not have caused
any trial prejudice to cumulate.
In addition, his claim of a biased jury is incompatible with cumulative error
review. If the jury was biased, the error could not be harmless. Because the
cumulative error doctrine cumulates only harmless error, inclusion of this claim of
error in the cumulative error analysis is logically impossible.
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The only alleged error Sellers has asserted that could even potentially be
found harmless is Sellers’ claim of instructional error. Because only one error
could be held harmless and is therefore even theoretically subject to analysis
under the cumulative error rule, there is no potentially viable claim that there are
two errors to cumulate.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s
judgment of conviction.
DATED this 25th day of April, 2016.
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